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Thinking about international trade and trade policy is typically based on models that as-
sume perfectly and costlessly enforced property rights. Especially in transnational settings,
however, where there is no ultimate authority to enforce property rights, countries expend
resources on their defense and diplomacy in order to secure their borders and interests
or, to put it dierently, to self-enforce their property rights. Moreover, sometimes coun-
tries engage in wars that induce destruction and, at the same time, imply a diversion of
(otherwise) productive resources, beyond that observed during peacetime. These costs are
considerable by several measures1 and therefore, one would suspect, they are of economic
relevance. Nevertheless, assessing the economic relevance of security costs is dicult, given
the absence of such costs in models of international trade.2
As an example of the problems and issues we seek to understand, consider the countries
along the Nile river, as discussed in Klare (2001). The economy of Egypt critically depends
on the Nile owing at the rate that it has owed for millennia, and given Egypt's popula-
tion growth that dependence is not likely to fall in the foreseeable future. The countries
located upstream|i.e., Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and
Uganda|are poorer than Egypt, and using the Nile for power-generation and irrigation
would be a key factor in their economic development. Of course, such use of the Nile by
these upstream countries would result in a reduced ow to Egypt and serious harm to its
economy. When Ethiopia, with the help of the World Bank, was drawing plans to build
dams in its territory, Egypt credibly threatened to destroy the dams using its air force.
Debates over the usage of the Nile's water remain largely unresolved, with signicant impli-
cations having both security and economic dimensions. The value of water to Egypt and the
other up-stream countries depends on, among other factors, their degree of trade openness
and the prices of traded goods that use water as an input. For example, the international
price of Egyptian cotton, a good that uses water as a main input, also aects the value of
1Military expenditures alone were about 2.6 percent of world GDP during 2004, varying from less than
1 percent for a few countries to more than 10 percent for Saudi Arabia (SIPRI, 2005). As for the overall
costs of conict (including civil war), Hess (2003) estimates a lower bound for the yearly cost of conict of 8
percent of steady state consumption for the 1960 to 1992 period. For high-income countries like the United
States and France the cost was a bit over 3 percent of consumption, whereas for Iraq and Iran, largely as a
result of the war between then, it was 65 percent and 26 percent of their respective yearly consumptions.
2Political scientists have long been interested in the linkages between international trade and conict. (See
Barbieri and Schneider (1999), who have surveyed much of the theoretical and empirical literatures on the
subject.) Economists, by contrast, have only begun to explore the relationship between security and trade.
Examples include Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) and Anderton et al. (1999), who analyze Ricardian
models in which traded commodities are insecure either because of the presence of pirates and bandits or
because the contending sides inuence the terms of trade through arming. Both approaches emphasize the
important point that international trade can be hampered by the anarchic nature of international relations.
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) address some of the implications of insecure property in the context
of simple exchange models.the Nile's water ow to Egypt.
For this example of international contestation of resources and similar ones,3 a number
of questions naturally arise. How does insecurity of productive resources aect military
expenditures and other related costs borne by the countries claiming ownership of such
resources? Do these security costs vary with the trade openness of the countries involved?
Does insecurity signicantly distort the allocation of resources within each country towards
dierent productive uses compared with the absence of insecurity? And, of course, how
does insecurity aect overall economic well-being?
To tackle such questions, we take a micro-founded, economic approach that allows for the
interdependence of security and trade policies. To be more precise, we extend the canonical
neoclassical model of trade, with two factors of production and two consumption goods,
in two substantive ways: First, we abandon the assumption that property rights on both
factors are perfectly and costlessly enforced. Instead, at least part of the total endowment
of one factor is considered insecure and subject to dispute.4 We will be calling this factor
\land." It could contain oil, diamonds, other natural resources, or water. Second, other
than the two consumption goods, there is a third possible output that can be produced by
combining the two factors of production. That output, \guns" or \arms," represents the
direct costs of insecurity and is used solely to contest the insecure portion of the disputed
factor of production. The regular neoclassical model (which we also call the \Nirvana"
model, to use Demsetz's (1969) apt term) is the limiting case of our model when security
is perfect and there is no arming. We also suppose the countries are \small," in the sense
that they behave as price-takers in international markets for the two nal goods.5
Our central ndings oer a new perspective, one that diers signicantly from that pro-
vided by the canonical neoclassical model of trade. Perhaps the most obvious and poten-
tially the most empirically signicant result is that, given arming is used only in contesting
disputed resources and not directly in producing nal goods for consumption, economic
well-being is lower relative to the case where property rights are perfectly and costlessly
3Territorial disputes or, more generally, competing claims over resources (notably land, oil, natural gas as
well as water) have resulted in numerous conicts throughout history and nowadays (Klare, 2001). Renner
(2002, p.6) reports that about a quarter of the roughly 50 wars and armed conicts that were active in 2001
had a strong resource dimension.
4While the extant trade theory has ruled out these problems by assumption, there are notable exceptions
including Chichilnisky (1994), who argues that trade may reduce welfare in the South by accentuating the
over-exploitation of an open-access resource in which it has a comparative advantage, and Brander and
Taylor (1997a), who formally proved this idea. See also Hotte et al. (2000) who study the eects of trade in
an open-access resource and extend the analysis to consider the evolution of private enforcement in dynamic
environments. Margolis and Shogren (2002) consider a North-South trade model with enclosures. The key
dierence between these models and ours is that enforcement costs are due to active contestation of resources.
There are also important dierences in the models considered and most of the questions addressed.
5As described in more detail below, we suppose that there are three countries: two small countries that
contest the resource and another, large country (the \rest of the world.")
2enforced. The military planes that Egypt buys and the possible security countermeasures
(perhaps the future deployment of Patriot missiles as well as planes) taken by Ethiopia
in the absence of a lasting agreement of the Nile's water rights can be expected to lower
the welfare of Egyptians or of Ethiopians or of both. And, as the degree of insecurity|
dened as the portion of the total endowment of the contested factor of production that is
in dispute|increases, the welfare of the aected populations can be expected to fall.
Furthermore, security costs and, thus, the equilibrium distribution of power vary with
the trade regime. What is meant by \power" depends on the context, but here we dene
it as the share of the contested resource that each country receives, which depends on the
ratio of the countries' arms. Arming under autarky can be very dierent from arming
under free trade as the prices of factor inputs and outputs, in general, vary across these
two regimes. In the autarkic regime, arms are equalized across countries only under certain
special circumstances. Given the possibility of non-equalization of arms, one might naturally
wonder which country will have the \upper hand" in arms competition and, thus, be more
powerful. In general, the outcome depends on both the nature of technology and the
distribution of secure factor endowments between countries. One interesting nding is that
the relatively bigger economy (in terms of secure factor endowments) is not necessarily more
\powerful" (i.e., does not necessarily produce more arms). In the free trade regime, there
is a well known tendency for equalization of factor prices across countries, which in turn
creates an even greater tendency towards equalization of guns across countries (relative to
the autarkic regime) and thus towards a \leveling of the playing eld." In the extreme case
where such trade results in complete factor-price equalization and the degree of insecurity
is not too large, arming and thus power too are equalized across the two countries.6
Insecurity manifests itself not only in the diversion of resources away from the production
of consumption goods, but also in distortions in comparative advantage, and it can do so
in at least two ways: (i) to cause trade patterns to dier from the ones that would have
emerged under Nirvana; and, (ii) to alter the information content of the dierence between
free-trade and autarkic prices, possibly leading to an erroneous prediction of the direction
of trade ows. The key to understanding the logic underlying these eects is to note that,
by inducing nations to arm, insecurity alters the resources remaining for the production
6If the predicted tendency towards arms equalization is empirically relevant, then we would expect to
observe larger countries (in terms of GDP) devoting a smaller percentage of their GDP to arming than their
smaller adversaries. For three of four pairs of countries that have had a history of adversarial relationships,
the smaller country (in terms of GDP) has a higher fraction of GDP in military expenditures (Argentina
(1.3%) vs Chile (2.7%); India (2.5%) vs Pakistan (3%); Iran (2.5%) vs. Iraq (8.6%)). The one exception
is the Turkey-Greece pair (Turkey (5.3%) vs. Greece (4.3%)). Nonetheless, one might argue that Turkey
perceives itself to face battle on multiple fronts (Iran, Armenia, Syria, and most of all the Kurdish issue);
thus, if Turkey viewed Greece as its only foreign policy concern, it could easily be expected to have a lower
percentage of its GDP devoted to guns (the Kurdish insurgency is very expensive). [The above data are
from the CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/]
3of consumption goods. Suppose, for example, the technology for arming makes intensive
use of the perfectly secure resource (labor). Then, insecurity implies relatively less of that
resource is left for the production of traded goods. Consequently, under autarky, the market
clearing price of the consumption good that employs the secure resource intensively tends
to exceed the price that would have prevailed under Nirvana. The net eect is that there
exists a range of international prices for which a country is an importer of that consumption
good when there is insecurity, whereas it would have been an exporter of the same good
under Nirvana. Similarly, because the introduction of free trade in consumption goods alters
product prices, factor prices, arming incentives, and thus resources left for the production
of consumption goods, a country's true comparative advantage (given insecurity) can dier
from that which is implied by a simple comparison of autarkic prices to world prices. Both
of these distortions imply that the presence of insecurity plays an important role in the
determination of a country's actual trade patterns that traditional theory fails to capture.
Given that autarky and free trade yield dierent security costs, autarky can be superior
to trade. Such a welfare ranking obtains if the familiar gains from trade are outweighed by
higher costs of security under trade compared to autarky. In the case of identical countries,
if the world price of the consumption good produced intensively with the insecure resource
is less than the price that prevails under autarky, then the introduction of free trade lowers
the intensity of conict, and thus reinforces the familiar gains from trade. However, if the
world price of that same good is higher than the autarkic price, then the intensity of the
conict is higher; and, the added security costs under free trade relative to autarky can
swamp the traditional gains from trade, to result in lower economic welfare. Although
the added security costs under free trade increase with the world price above the autarkic
price, the traditional gains from trade increase at a faster rate. As such, the possibility
that autarky can Pareto dominate free trade arises only when the world price is not too
far above the representative country's autarkic price. Even when the countries involved in
conict dier with respect to their secure factor endowments, there exists a range of world
prices, one for each country, that renders free trade inferior to autarky from that individual
country's perspective. These results suggest that, in the presence of insecurity, protectionist
trade policies might be welfare-improving and thus preferable even for small countries, a
prediction that does not follow from the canonical Nirvana model of trade. However, in
the absence of trade policy coordination, the contesting countries might opt for free trade,
thereby locking themselves in a prisoner's dilemma situation. Moreover, depending on the
initial distribution of secure resources and on the world price, the countries' preferences and
thus possibly their choices over trade regimes may very well diverge.7
7That trade and security policies are somehow related may appear obvious. In fact, many embargoes,
sanctions, and various other forms of trade restrictions that have been used throughout history and continue
to be used today can be considered extensions of security policies (Hirschman, 1945). The British policy of
4The substantive characterization results we have just outlined do not depend on specic
functional forms of production or utility functions. Likewise, we provide rather general
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium under autarky and under
free trade. Thus, by providing a generalized treatment, we set the stage for both additional
applications of the augmented canonical trade model that allows for insecure property rights
and for extensions that include the important case of large countries, the latter being of
great relevance to the elds of international relations and international political economy
for studying the relationship between trade and security policies at the global level.
In the next section, we present the formal model and a preliminary analysis that proves
useful in subsequent sections. Then, in Section 3, we investigate optimal security policies,
conict, and the balance of power, under autarky and free trade. In Section 4, we explore
the implications of international conict for trade patterns and trade volumes. In Section
5, we compare autarky and free trade in terms of their impact on arming and welfare. In
Section 6, we briey examine some additional issues, including the choice of trade regime,
and the implications of commercial policies. Lastly, in Section 7, we oer several concluding
comments. All technical arguments and proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Framework and Preliminary Analysis
Consider a global economy that consists of two countries, indexed by i = 1;2, and the rest of
the world (ROW), which for simplicity is treated as a single entity and taken as exogenous.
Each country can produce two consumption goods (say \butter" and \oil"), indexed by
j = 1;2, using labor and land under conditions of constant returns to scale. In the spirit of
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade model, we assume the countries have access
to the same production technology; consumers have identical and homothetic preferences
dened over the two consumption goods; and, all markets are perfectly competitive. Each
country i possesses Li units of secure labor and Ki units of secure land. However, departing
from the HOS trade model, we assume there exists additional land of K0 units. Although
this additional land is divisible, its division between the two countries is subject to dispute.8
Policymakers use arming to gain control of the disputed resource, K0, with the ultimate
goal of maximizing national welfare.9
Let country i's \guns" be denoted by Gi, a variable most accurately viewed as a pro-
ducible composite commodity that reects country i's military capability. Country i's share
appeasement towards Germany during the 1930s was based on classical liberal arguments about the use of
economic carrots to avoid war (Kagan, 1995).
8The insecure resource could also be interpreted as a natural resource (e.g., oil, water) or simply physical
capital.
9The assumption that leaders are benevolent could be relaxed. However, since our main objective here is
to provide a unied framework for the analysis of arming incentives and trade openness, such an important
modication will necessarily have to be addressed in future work.










i=1;2 Gi = 0;
(1)
for i = 1;2 (j 6= i), where f()  0, f(0) = 0, f0() > 0, limGi!0 f0(Gi) = 1, and
f00()  0.10 According to (1), the fraction of the disputed resource a country secures in
the contest depends on its own guns as well as those of its adversary. Specically, it is
increasing in the country's own guns (i
Gi  @i=@Gi > 0) and decreasing in the guns of its
adversary (i
Gj  @i=@Gj < 0, j 6= i).11 Clearly, each country has an incentive to produce
guns, whereby it can obtain a larger share of the contested land and thus more income.
But, there is an opportunity cost of doing so|namely, the loss in income as resources are
diverted away from the production of consumption goods. This trade-o, which is trade-
regime dependent, plays a prominent role in the determination of the countries' security
policies.12
The setting here is an anarchic one, so that writing enforceable (binding) contracts on
the proliferation of arms and the division of K0 is not possible. Instead, we view guns as the
\enforcement" variable that determines both the distribution of the contested resource and
the endowments of labor and land that can be employed in useful production. Accordingly,
the sequence of events is as follows:
(i) Given the initial inter-country conguration of secure factor endowments (Li and Ki),
the two countries (i = 1;2) simultaneously choose their (irreversible) production of
guns Gi.
(ii) Once these choices are made, the contested land is divided according to (1): each
country i receives iK0 units of the contested resource.
(iii) With the quantities of land and labor left for the production of consumption goods
having thus been determined, private production and consumption decisions take
10As revealed in the Appendix, the condition that limGi!0 f
0(G
i) = 1 and the assumed concavity of
f() help establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. See Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatization of
(1), requiring only that f() is a non-negative, increasing function. One functional form for f() that has
been widely used in the rent-seeking literature, as well as in the literatures on tournaments and conict, is
f(G) = G
 where  2 (0;1] (Tullock, 1980). See Hirshleifer (1989) for a comparison of the properties of this
form with those of f(G) = e
G.
11The inuence of guns on a country's share, 
i(G
i;G
j), could be taken literally or viewed as the reduced
form of a bargaining process, in which relative arming gures prominently in the division of the contested
resource. See Anbarci et al. (2002) for an analysis of this issue and how, in particular, dierent bargaining
solution concepts lead to division rules that vary in their sensitivity to guns.
12While countries often build their own military constellation, they can, in practice, also buy or sell certain
weapons in the world market, as well as hire mercenaries or foreign security experts. However, to highlight
how pure trade in goods aects arming incentives, we abstract from such possibilities here, focusing instead
on the case where guns can be produced only domestically.
6place. Under autarky, prices adjust to clear domestic markets. Under free trade, the
prices of consumption goods are xed in the world market.
A conictual equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in guns, conditional on the prevailing
trade regime.
To complete the basic model, we now specify the supply and demand sides of each
economy. Starting with the supply side, let  i   (wi;ri) and ci
j  cj(wi;ri) represent
respectively the unit cost functions of guns and goods j = 1;2 in country i, where wi and
ri denote competitively determined factor prices|respectively, the wage paid to labor and
the rental rate paid to landowners. These unit cost functions have the usual properties,
including concavity and linear homogeneity in factor prices. By Shephard's lemma, the unit
labor and land requirements in arms production are given respectively by  i
w  @ i=@wi > 0
and  i
r  @ i=@ri > 0. Similarly, ai
Kj  @ci
j=@ri > 0 and ai
Lj  @ci
j=@wi > 0 represent the
unit land and labor requirements in producing good j. Therefore, the land/labor ratio in
guns is ki
G   i
r= i




2 is land-intensive if ki
2 > ki
1 (or labor-intensive if ki
2 < ki
1) at all relevant factor prices. We
follow much of the literature based on the HOS trade model in ruling out factor intensity
reversals. Although we will show how the ranking of factor intensities across industries
j = 1;2 matters, for specicity we emphasize throughout much of the discussion the case
where good 2 is produced intensively with the insecure resource (i.e., land).
Taking good 1 as the numeraire, let pi denote the relative price of good 2 in country i.
With diversication in production, perfect competition requires
c1(wi;ri) = ai
L1wi + ai
K1ri = 1 (2)
c2(wi;ri) = ai
L2wi + ai
K2ri = pi; (3)
for i = 1;2. These equations, together with the assumption of identical technologies across
countries and the properties of unit cost functions, imply that the wage/rental ratio, !i 
wi=ri, can be written as a function of pi (i.e., !i = !(pi)). By the Stolper-Samuelson (1941)
theorem, !i
p( @!=@pi) 7 0 as ki
2 ? ki
1 (see Lemma A1 in the Appendix).
Let Xi
j denote the output of good j and (Ki
X;Li
X) denote the vector of residual quantities
of resources left for the production of consumption goods in country i once labor and land
resources for guns Gi, respectively  i
wGi and  i
rGi, have already been set aside and the
distribution of the contested resource has been realized, iK0. Factor market clearing and
diversication in production (i.e., Xi













X ( Li    i
wGi): (5)
7Now, let ki








Ki + iK0    i
rGi
Li    i
wGi ; for i = 1;2: (6)
Then, it is straightforward to verify, from (4) and (5) along with the linear homogeneity of
unit cost functions and the fact that !i = !(pi), that the relative supply of good 2 (oil),
RSi  Xi
2=Xi
1, can be written as RSi = RS(pi;ki
X). In the Appendix (Lemma A1) we show
(i) @RSi=@pi > 0 due to increasing opportunity costs, and (ii) @RSi=@ki
X ? 0 as ki
2 ? ki
1
by the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. Further, as can be seen from (6), when both goods
are produced, the residual land/labor ratio can be written as a function of the relative
price of good 2, the guns produced by the two countries, and resource endowments. To
avoid cluttering of notation, we write this function as ki
X = ki
X(pi;Gi;Gj). Lemma A2 in
the Appendix describes the dependence of ki
X on its arguments. The important point to
recognize at this stage is that the relative supply of good 2 can also be written as a function
of the price and guns: RSi = RS(pi;Gi;Gj). The exact nature of this relationship, which
we characterize in the next section, is needed in the identication of market-clearing prices
and in the analysis of conict under autarky.
Turning to the demand side of each economy, we suppose that consumers' preferences,
dened over the consumption of goods 1 and 2, are homothetic. Letting Ri and i  (pi)
denote respectively net national income and the marginal utility of income, country i's
indirect utility (aggregate welfare) function can be written as13
V i  V i(pi;Gi;Gj) = (pi)Ri(pi;Ki
X;Li
X); for i = 1;2 (j 6= i): (7)
Equation (7) implicitly assumes that policymakers nance the cost of arming with nondis-
tortionary income taxes.14 This assumption together with that of perfect competition
imply that country i's net national income (Ri) is the country's maximized value of do-
mestic production of consumption goods and, at the same time, the minimized value of





X for i = 1;2, which explains the arguments of Ri and V i in
(7).15 As one can verify, Ri is increasing and convex in pi, and increasing and concave in
the residual factor inputs (Ki
X;Li
X). Furthermore, the supply of good 2 satises Xi
2 = Ri
p
13In this expression, we suppress the obvious dependence of V
i on resource endowments to avoid cluttering.
14We are also assuming that governments can adjust taxes to meet their security obligations in the absence
of public resistance. In practice, scal objections to expenditures on security|for, say, economic, political or
ideological reasons|can limit the government's budgetary exibility. Moreover, we do not consider looting
as a possible source of nance.
15R
i should be identied with the familiar gross domestic product (GDP) or revenue function (Dixit and
Norman, 1980), excluding arms expenditures.
8( @Ri=@pi) and @Xi
2=@pi = Ri
pp  0, while factor prices satisfy wi = Ri
L ( @Ri=@Li
X)
and ri = Ri
K ( @Ri=@Ki
X).
Using Roy's identity, country i's demand function for good 2 can be written as a share of
the country's net national income: Di
2 = i
DRi=pi, where the associated expenditure share
is given by i
D  D(pi) =  pii
p=i (> 0).16 Now, since the supply of good 2 is given by
Xi
2 = Ri
p, the excess demand for (or net imports of) good 2 is given by Mi  Di
2   Xi
2.17
Then, holding xed the secure resource endowments (Ki and Li) as well as the disputed
resource (K0), total dierentiation of (7) yields
dV i = (pi)

 Midpi + (riK0i
Gi    i)dGi + riK0i
GjdGj
for i = 1;2 (j 6= i): (8)
The rst term inside the square brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income (pi),
is a terms of trade eect. For net importers of good 2, an increase in pi increases the
domestic cost of good 2, and is thus welfare-reducing. By contrast, such an increase in the
relative price is welfare-improving for net exporters of good 2.
The second term in the brackets (weighted by (pi)) captures the welfare eect of a
change in country i's guns, Gi. Ceteris paribus, an increase in Gi increases country i's
share of the contested land and thus its national income (the rst term in the parentheses).
At the same time, however, the increase in Gi draws additional resources away from the
production of consumption goods and thus reduces national income (the second term inside
the parentheses).
The third term in the brackets (again weighted by (pi)) captures the welfare eect of
a change in arms by country i's opponent, Gj. An increase in Gj reduces country i's share
of the contested resource and thus its income, and thereby adversely aects that country.
Note that, for xed product prices, an equi-proportionate expansion of both countries'
guns, where G1 = G2 initially, implies no change in the division of the contested land, while
increasing the resource cost of guns, and thus necessarily leaves both countries worse o.
We now demonstrate how the above ideas inform the derivation of the optimizing se-
curity policies (arming) under alternative trade regimes. A key feature of the optimization
problem facing each country i is that, with diversication in production, the corresponding
rst-order condition (FOC), given by
V i
Gi(pi;Gi;Gj) = (pi)ri 
K0i
Gi    i=ri
= 0 for i = 1;2 (j 6= i); (9)
16It can be shown that this share is decreasing or increasing in p
i, depending on whether the elasticity of
substitution in consumption is larger or smaller than unity, respectively.
17We omit subscript \2" from \M
i" to avoid cluttering of notation.
9is independent of the trade regime being considered.18 Under autarky, domestic product
market clearing requires pi to adjust so that Mi = 0, which implies that the rst term inside
the brackets in (8) vanishes, thereby yielding (9) as the relevant FOC. Under free trade in
consumption goods, product prices are invariant to security policies for \small" countries;
thus, the rst term also vanishes under this trade regime.
Equation (9) shows that country i's net marginal payo from arming consists of two key
components: (i) the marginal benet of producing guns, which is given by MBi  K0i
Gi
when measured in land units; and (ii) the marginal cost of producing guns, which is given
by MCi   i=ri (again measured in land units). Note that MBi is independent of pi and,
as such, of the trade regime considered. By contrast, as shown below, MCi is trade-regime
dependent. Lemma 1 and the discussion to follow elaborate on these ideas further.




GiGj R 0 if Gi R Gj, j 6= i;
(c) V i
Gipi ? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1 when evaluated at the value of Gi that solves V i
Gi = 0;
(d) V i is strictly quasi-convex in pi, and is minimized at the value of pi that solves Mi = 0:
As shown in the Appendix, parts (a) and (b) follow from the properties of the CSF in
(1). Part (a) establishes the strict concavity of V i in country i's guns (Gi) given the guns
chosen by its rival (Gj), and thus explains the downward sloping shape of MBi depicted in
Fig. 1.19 According to part (b), each country's net marginal payo to arming rises or falls
with its rival's arms (i.e., MBi in Fig. 1 shifts up or down) depending on which contender
initially produces more guns. Part (c) states that, at an optimum, the inuence of changes
in the relative price (pi) on the net marginal payo from country i's arming depends on the
ranking of the factor intensities in industries 1 and 2. Since the marginal benet of guns
(MBi) is independent of pi, this inuence is driven by the impact of a change in pi on the
country's marginal cost (MCi). To see this eect, rst observe that the linear homogeneity
of the unit cost function for guns ( i) and the fact that  i
w > 0 imply that country i's
marginal cost of arming can be written as MCi =  i=ri =  (!i;1) and is increasing in the
country's wage/rental ratio (!i). By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (see also Lemma A1(a)
18Our discussion here and to follow is based on the assumption that, under autarky, the distribution
of factor endowments between the adversaries is such that their production of arms is not constrained
by their secure land holdings. Under free trade, we assume further that technology, the distribution of
factor endowments, the quantity of the contested resource and the world price are such that production of
consumption goods is diversied.
19Note that, from the denition of MB
i and the properties of the CSF, MB
i depends on the amount of
land being disputed, K0, as well as on the guns produced by both countries, G
i and G
j; furthermore, the
condition that limGi!0 f
0(G
i) = 1 implies limGi!0 MB
i = 1.
10in the Appendix), an increase in pi decreases (increases) !i and thus decreases (increases)





Under free trade when production is diversied, the world price alone determines the
wage/ rental ratio (!i). This ratio is thus invariant to changes in Gi. It follows that MCi is
a constant function under this regime, as indicated by the red dotted line in Fig. 1. Under
autarky, by contrast, product (and thus factor) prices are endogenous. In the next section,
we show that MCi is generally increasing in Gi under this regime, as depicted by the blue
dashed-line curve in Fig. 1.
Part (d) is a well-known property of indirect utility functions (Dixit and Norman, 1980),
highlighting the important idea that, for given guns, a country's welfare is higher, the greater
is the deviation of product prices from their autarkic levels.
Using an asterisk (*) to indicate optimizing policies, the next lemma shows how, given
diversication in production of consumption goods, technology in the consumption goods
sectors and product price dierences across the contending countries are related to the
countries' optimizing guns choices.







R 0 =) G1 R G2:
According to Lemma 2, the country with the larger relative price of the insecure-resource-
intensive good (i.e., good 2 if ki
2 > ki
1 or good 1 if ki
1 > ki
2) produces more guns. This nding
proves useful in our characterization of conictual equilibria and comparative advantage.20
3 Trade Regimes and Conict
In this section, we explore the implications of the trade regime|autarky and free trade|for
arming, the distribution of power, and welfare. We now use an asterisk (*) to indicate Nash
equilibrium values, dierentiating between trade regimes with subscripts \A" for autarky
and \F" for free trade. We rst consider autarky and then free trade.
3.1 Conict under autarky
The rst-order conditions in (9) reveal that the optimizing security policies (Gi, i = 1;2)
depend on the product prices prevailing in the respective country, pi. Thus, to close the
model we need two additional conditions that determine the autarkic prices, pi
A for i = 1;2.
20It is worth noting that, when product prices are endogenous (as in the case of autarky), the \if" part in
Lemma 2 becomes \if and only if."










for i = 1;2, (10)
where RD(pi) denotes the relative demand for good 2. While the demand for good 2, as
noted above, is given by Di
2 = i
DRi=pi, the demand for good 1 is Di
1 = (1   i
D)Ri; as






of consumer preferences implies RD(pi) is uniquely determined by and decreasing in the
relative price of good 2, pi. In addition, as noted above, the relative supply of good 2 (RSi),
shown in the right-hand side (RHS) of (10), is increasing in pi.
We can now establish the following, which shows how the equilibrium price is inuenced
by exogenous changes in guns and resource endowments:
Lemma 3. Under autarky, country i's market clearing price of the non-numeraire good,
pi
A, and its residual land/labor ratio, ki
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By the Rybczynski theorem, an increase in a country's residual land/labor ratio (ki
X)
expands the relative supply of its land-intensive good (also see Lemma A1(b) in the Ap-
pendix), and thereby creates an excess supply that forces its autarkic price to fall. Parts
(a){(d) follow immediately from this relationship and the dependence of ki
X on guns and
resource endowments, as mentioned earlier and described in Lemma A2 of the Appendix.
Part (a) implies that a country's marginal cost of producing guns under autarky, MCi
A =
 (!(pi
A);1), is increasing in the country's guns regardless of the ranking of factor intensities
in the consumption goods industries. The logic here is as follows. In the neighborhood of the
optimum implicitly dened by (9), an increase in Gi raises country i's residual land/labor
ratio, ki
X (see Lemma A2(b) in the Appendix). Now, suppose ki
2 > ki
1. Then, as shown in
Lemma A1(b), this increase translates into an increase in the relative supply of good 2 (RSi),
causing the autarkic price of good 2 (pi
A) to fall. Alternatively, if ki
2 < ki
1, the increase in ki
X
causes pi
A to rise. In both cases, by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (also see Lemma A1(a)),
these price adjustments, in turn, force the wage/rental ratio (!i) to rise and thus induce
12MCi
A to rise with Gi. Similar reasoning establishes that MCi
A increases with increases in
the country's secure endowment of land (Ki) and in the amount of disputed land (K0)
and falls with increases in the country's secure endowment of labor (Li) and in the other
country's guns (Gj, j 6= i). Furthermore, part (c) indicates that MCi
A increases (decreases)
with equi-proportionate increases of both countries' guns, where Gi = Gj initially, provided
that the land/labor intensity ratio in the production of guns (ki
G) is less (greater) than the
country's ratio of ex post secure land/labor holdings (ki). Obviously, the intersection of
MCi
A with MBi at point A in Fig. 1 gives country i's best-response function, Bi
A(Gj).
The inuence of technology, the degree of resource insecurity (institutions), and the size
of factor endowments on autarkic prices and thus on the marginal cost of arming can have
important implications for optimal security policies. To esh out these implications, we rst
establish that a pure-strategy equilibrium in security policies exists. Since the dependence
of conictual equilibria on trade regimes and their comparison are central to our analysis,
we also identify (sucient) conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and then proceed to
characterize it.
Theorem 1. (Autarky) An interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (security policies)
exists. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique if the technology for arms is suciently
labor-intensive or the inputs to arms are not very close complements.
As indicated by the proof of Theorem 1, uniqueness of equilibrium can be assured under
fairly general circumstances.21 The proof also claries how the endogeneity of prices matters
for the shapes of best-response functions, Bi
A(Gj) (i = 1;2, j 6= i), which are illustrated
in Fig. 2 by the solid-line curves.22 As shown in gure, the best-response function of
each country, Bi
A(Gj), is positively related to the adversary's arming choice (reecting
strategic complementarity) up to and beyond its point of intersection with the 45 line;
however, at some point beyond that intersection, the function becomes negatively related
to Gj, (reecting strategic substitutability).23 The conictual (Nash) equilibrium under
21The proof is based on the assumption that not all secure land supplies are absorbed into the production of
guns, but can be amended to allow this possibility. One sucient condition that precludes this complication
from arising is that the degree of land insecurity (i.e., the fraction of contested land) is not too high. Another
possible condition is that guns are produced with labor only (k
i
G = 0). Note that, in any case, provided that
both factors are essential to the production of consumption goods, labor will never be fully absorbed in the
production of guns in the autarkic regime.
22Ignore the other curves drawn in the gure for now.
23The shape of a country's best-response function depends, in part, on how the marginal benet of arming
(MB
i) is inuenced the country rival's security policies (see Lemma 1(b)). However, where G
1 = G
2
initially, a small increase in G
j has no eect on this marginal benet (see (A.4) in the Appendix). Thus,
the strategic complementarity of security policies along the 45
 line is due instead to the indirect inuence
of the adversary's guns (G
j, j 6= i) on the marginal cost of arming (MC
i
A), through the autarkic price (p
i
A)
as noted in Lemma 3(b). In particular, regardless of which consumption good is land-intensive, an increase
in G
j (j 6= i), through its impact on p
i
A and thus on !
i
A, reduces country i's marginal cost of arming at each
G
i and thus induces country i to respond more aggressively by producing more guns.
13autarky is depicted by the intersection of best-response functions.24 One such equilibrium|
a symmetric one|is point A, where B1
A and B2
A intersect along the 45 line. Point A0 (where
the red dotted-line best-response functions intersect) depicts an asymmetric equilibrium.
Several important questions naturally arise. What determines the relative arming incen-
tives of the two contenders and thus military superiority (power) under autarky? Clearly,
the distribution of secure factor endowments between the two adversaries matters. But,
how? Is economic might equivalent to military might? Or, in the words of Jack Hirsh-
leifer (1991, p. 177), \Can initially weaker or poorer contenders end up gaining on initially
stronger or wealthier opponents?"
We begin to address these questions, among others, with the help of Fig. 3, where for
specicity we assume ki
2 > ki
1 > ki
G. By construction, the sides of the outer rectangle depict
the aggregate supplies of land (including K0) and labor that are available to the contenders.
The sides of the inner rectangle A1B1A2B2 identify the aggregate quantities of secure land
and labor. Points in this inner rectangle give the distribution of secure resources across
countries, with point Ai being country i's origin. The vertical distance OiAi (i = 1;2), from
the horizontal sides of the outer rectangle to those of A1B1A2B2, shows the quantity of K0
country i secures in the contest, iK0.
Consider rst the benchmark case, where countries 1 and 2 have identical secure endow-
ments, as indicated by the midpoint of the diagonal A1A2 (D). To dierentiate the resulting
equilibrium values from others, we place a tilde () over the associated variables. Since the
countries are identical, they face identical arming incentives; therefore, Gi
A = e G
A, with each
country thus receiving one half of the contested resource, K0. Now thinking of point Oi as
country i's origin of overall endowments, we have O1A1 = O2A2 = 1
2K0, with vectors OiCi
and CiD depicting the resources country i devotes to the production of arms and consump-
tion goods, respectively.25 By symmetry, O1C1 = O2C2 and C1D = C2D. Furthermore, by
Lemma 2, pi
A = e p
A and thus !i
A = e !
A and ki
X = e k
X for each i. The sides of parallelogram
C1J1C2J2 capture the aggregate sectoral distribution of resources in the production of good
1 (sides C1J1 = C2J2) and the production of good 2 (sides C1J2 = C2J1).26
One might naturally ask if there are other distributions of secure endowments that
similarly yield a symmetric equilibrium in guns (i.e., G1 = G2) and thus imply the possible
emergence of the \paradox of power" under autarky. To proceed, we dene the following sets
in the context of Fig. 3: S0  F1F2, S1  F1F2A2B2 (excluding S0), and S2  F2F1A1B1
24Note that, because each country always has an incentive to produce a small (but positive) quantity of
arms when its rival produces none, (0;0) is not a Nash equilibrium.
25One can conrm, from the FOCs shown in (9), that the quantity of land employed in the production of
arms in country i, K
i
G   
i
rG
i, does not exceed
1
4K0.




















14(again excluding S0).27 We can now establish the following:
Proposition 1. (Arming and Autarkic Prices) Under autarky, there exists a non-empty
set of asymmetric factor distributions under which contending states face identical market-
clearing prices, produce identical quantities of arms, and are equally powerful. All other
asymmetric distributions generate dierent prices and unequal arming and power. Speci-
cally, for each country i = 1;2 (j 6= i),
(a) Gi
A = e G
A and pi
A = e p









1 for factor distributions in Si.
Proposition 1 indicates that the symmetric equilibrium ( e G
A; e p
A) arises not only when
the contending sides are identical, but also when they dier with respect to their secure
resource endowments. In particular, part (a) indicates that the symmetric equilibrium
arises for all secure factor distributions in S0, shown as a thick blue line (set) going through
point D in Fig. 3. The key property of these distributions is that they all imply the same
residual land/labor ratio: k1
X = k2
X = e k
X. To see this, consider the following experiment.
Starting at the symmetric point D, transfer both land and labor resources from country 2
to country 1 so that we move along S0 in the direction of point E. For constant guns and
prices, such a redistribution of resources leaves the value of the residual land/labor ratios
unchanged at e k
X.28 Thus, the countries' relative supply and relative demand functions do
not shift; and, there is no pressure for autarkic prices to change. But, given prices do, in
fact, remain xed at e p
A for all secure resource distributions in S0, arming incentives remain
unchanged in both countries, and the parallelogram C1J1C2J2 will continue to capture the
overall allocation of resources into goods 1 and 2.
Part (b) shows the conditions under which a country arms more heavily than its ad-
versary, and identies the implications for the relative ranking of autarkic prices in two
countries. For some intuition, consider an initial secure resource distribution in S0, say
point E in Fig. 3, which assumes ki
2 > ki
1. By Proposition 1(a), the conictual equilibrium
is initially on the 45 line of Fig. 2, at point A, where B1
A and B2
A intersect. Now arbitrarily
transfer labor from country 2 to country 1, such as that implied by the move from point
E to point H 2 S1 in Fig. 3. According to Lemma 3(d) with ki
2 > ki
1, this transfer of
labor raises country 1's autarkic price, which in turn decreases its marginal cost of arming
(Lemma 1(c)); at the same, the loss of labor for country 2 reduces its autarkic price, and
thus increases its marginal cost of arming. As a consequence, country 1 (2) will behave
more (less) aggressively, as shown in Fig. 2 by the clockwise rotation of B1
A to B10
A and that
27For endowment distributions in the shaded regions of Fig. 3, the initial secure land holdings are binding
in the production of guns. The analysis could be amended to consider these distributions. But, for simplicity
and clarity, we focus on secure factor distributions in fS
0 [ S
1 [ S
2g, and assume that that the degree of
insecurity is not too high, such that S
0 contains the symmetric distribution, D, as well as asymmetric ones.
28Note that along S



























A. The properties of the best-response functions described earlier (and in the
proof to Theorem 1) ensure that the new equilibrium point lies below the 45 line, such
as point A0 in the gure, where clearly country 1 arms more heavily than its adversary.
By Lemma 2, under the maintained assumption that ki
2 > ki
1, this divergence in the two
countries' guns production, G1 > G2, is consistent with the divergence in their autarkic
prices described above, p1
A > p2
A .29
Proposition 1 suggests generally that the relationship between factor abundance, arming,
and military superiority in the autarkic regime is complex and multi-faceted. Dierences in
secure resource endowments across countries need translate into dierences in their arming
and thus unequal power. Consistent with the \paradox of power"" (Hirshleifer, 1991),
the initially resource disadvantaged side could obtain an equal share of the contested pie,
as illustrated in the case of unequal distributions of secure land and labor endowments
in S0. However, the possible emergence of the paradox of power is not limited to such
distributions. Consider, for example, point Q 2 S1 in Fig. 3. Although country 1's secure
factor endowments (and income) are smaller than its opponent's at Q, country 1 arms more
heavily and commands a bigger share of the contested resource than its rival. It might be
tempting to conclude that country 1 arms more heavily in this case because it is relatively
less well endowed in the contested resource (land): K1=L1 < K2=L2 at point Q. However,
this reasoning would be incorrect, as illustrated by point H 2 S1, where country 1 again
produces more guns, but is relatively more abundant in land (i.e., K1=L1 > K2=L2). What
part (b) (with Fig. 3) makes clear is that, for any given distribution of the secure land
between the contending states, the more powerful country is that which has a suciently
large (though not necessarily larger) endowment of the uncontested resource, labor.
In addition, Proposition 1 implies that, in the presence of insecure property, the rela-
tionship between a country's autarkic price and secure land/labor endowment ratio is not
necessarily monotonic. Specically, in contrast to the neoclassical world where all property
is secure, the country with the largest ex ante or ex post secure land/labor ratio (respec-
tively, Ki=Li and ki  (Ki+iK0)=Li) need not enjoy the lowest relative price of the good
that employs land intensively. Compare, for example, dierent distributions in S0 where
the countries' secure land/labor endowment ratios dier, but pi
A = e p
A at the same time.30
What matters for both military superiority and the ranking of the two countries' autarkic
prices is how the countries' residual factor endowments (i.e., k1
X and k2
X ), which are them-
29To be sure, given the changes in autarkic prices and guns induced by a hypothetical change in the
distribution of secure resources from S
0 to S
i, Fig. 3's depictions of (i) the distribution the insecure





2) no longer apply.
30This point can also be seen by comparing dierent endowment congurations along A
1A
2 where both
countries have identical ex ante secure land/labor ratios. For these points, market clearing prices would be
identical across countries if all property were secure but they are not when some property is insecure.
16selves endogenous in the presence of conict, compare with e k
X.31 For distributions in Si,
we have ki
X < e k
X < k
j
X, regardless of the ranking of factor intensities across industries.
By now, it should be clear that the international distribution of secure resources has
important implications for arming and power. The next proposition, which outlines the
implications of secure endowment reassignments, proves useful in our upcoming comparison
of trade regimes.
Proposition 2. (Transfers of Secure Resources) For initial factor distributions in S0, a
small transfer of a secure resource from country j to its adversary i (6= j) has the following
































dKi < (e p
A)r(e p
A):
Part (a) shows that the eects of a transfer of secure resources on equilibrium arming
depend on the type of resource transfer considered.32 Interestingly, while the country with
the increased (reduced) labor endowment produces more (less) guns in the new equilibrium,
exactly the opposite is true for redistributions of secure land. The driving force behind these
eects is the impact of endowment changes on autarkic prices, which inuence factor prices
and ultimately the contestants' marginal costs of producing guns. Thus, under autarky, the
composition of secure assets in the contending states has important implications for relative
arming and the emergence of the paradox of power we referred to earlier.33
To understand part (b), we extend the decomposition of welfare eects in (8) to include
the eect of changes in the countries' secure holdings of resources. Focusing on labor
















for i = 1;2 (j 6= i); (11)
31The endogeneity of k
i
X is also important for predicting trade patterns, as shown below.
32Note that while Proposition 1 provides a global sort of result in identifying the shifts in the best-response
functions for small changes in secure endowments and the implications for how G
1 and G
2 compare, this
proposition provides local results for small changes in secure endowments in the neighborhood of S
0. As
shown in the proof (in the Appendix) this comparative static exercise necessarily factors in the strategic
eects of such changes.
33In part (a), the osetting changes in the contestants' guns imply that the resource redistributions
considered leave the aggregate production of guns unchanged. It can be shown that, if the initial resource
distribution is in S
i, redistributions of the type considered in part (a) typically generate a reduction in the
aggregate production of guns. Even more interestingly, when the initial distribution is suciently unequal
across countries, resource redistributions may induce both to produce less guns. Thus, the extent to which
secure endowments dier across countries has important implications for the intensity of conict between
them.
17where pi
A = e p
A for initial distributions in S0. As shown in (11), a transfer of labor generates
two eects. The rst term in the brackets (weighted by the marginal utility of income)
represents a wage-income adjustment to the change in the country's labor endowment, which
is positive (negative) for the recipient (donor) country. The second term (also weighted by
the marginal utility of income) represents a strategic eect arising from the rival's response
in arming. By Proposition, (2a), this eect is similarly positive (negative) for the recipient
(donor) country. Not surprisingly, then, the overall welfare eect of a transfer of secure
labor resources is positive for the recipient country and negative for the donor country.
Analogous reasoning can be used to sort out the welfare eects of land redistributions. In
contrast to the case of labor redistributions, the welfare eects of land redistributions are
smaller in magnitude than the factor price related changes in national income.34
Next, we consider, for the case of where arms are initially equalized across countries,
the eects of an increase in the degree of land insecurity, in which K0 increases and each
country's secure resources Ki decrease at the same time, so as to leave the aggregate quantity
of land unchanged: dKi =  idK0 for i = 1;2:
Proposition 3. (Degree of Insecurity under Autarky) For initial factor distributions in

































As shown in the Appendix, increasing the degree of insecurity increases each contenders'
marginal benet of arming (MBi). Yet, since dKi =  1
2dK0 for i = 1;2, the change in the
composition of land endowments has no direct inuence on the autarkic price in the two
countries, and hence no direct inuence on their marginal cost of arming (MCi
A). The
overall eect can be illustrated in the context of Fig. 2 as a clockwise rotation in B1
A(G2)
and a counterclockwise rotation in B2
A(G1). For an initial distribution of secure resources
in S0, where Gi
A = e G
A and pi
A = e p
A for i = 1;2, these eects on the two countries'
best response functions are identical, such that they intersect along the 45 line, but to
the northeast of the intersection of the original functions. The welfare implications should
be clear. Since the total amount of land and labor and their distribution among the two
countries remain unchanged, an increase in the degree of insecurity induces more arming,
which draws additional resources away from the production of consumption goods, and thus
lowers income. Not surprisingly, welfare is maximized where the degree of insecurity is 0 (as
presumed in the traditional trade model), and decreases as the degree of insecurity rises.
34This dierence is due to the fact that the strategic eect in the case of a land transfer is negative
(positive) for the recipient (donor) country.
183.2 Conict under free trade
Turning to trade, we suppose the contending countries are \small" in world markets and
that there are no trade costs. Letting  denote the international price of the non-numeraire
good, free trade in consumption goods requires pi = , for i = 1;2. Since  is given by world
markets and thus independent of national security policies, a country's payo function can
be identied with its indirect utility function, V i. Depending on fundamentals, the degree
of land insecurity, and the international price level, it is possible, as in the case of autarky,
for arms production to be constrained by the countries' secure land holdings.35 It is also
possible now for one or both contestants to specialize completely in the production of one
consumption good.
But, to highlight the factor price eects of opening borders up to free trade and the
striking implications this can have for arming incentives, we focus on the case of diversied
production where the production of arms is not constrained by the countries' secure land
holdings. With parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 1, we rst obtain the following:
Theorem 2. (Free Trade) If the world price, technology, the distribution of secure endow-
ments and the degree of land insecurity are such that (i) free trade in consumption goods
leads to international factor price equalization, and (ii) the production of arms does not
exhaust either country's secure land endowment, an interior Nash equilibrium in security
policies will exist, and will be unique and symmetric.
To understand Theorem 2, suppose for now that  = e p
A and that the two countries
have identical secure resource endowments. Provided the conditions of the theorem are
fullled, the intersection of MBi and MCi
F (as illustrated in Fig. 1 at point A) determines
country i's best-response, Bi
F(Gj). Since under free trade product and thus factor prices
are independent of either country's security policy, the shapes of best-response functions are
determined solely by the properties of the CSF, i|that is, @Bi





GiGi R 0 when Gi R Gj. Thus, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the best-response func-
tions under free trade are upward-sloping (strategic complementarity) up to their point
of intersection with the 45 line, and downward sloping (strategic substitutability) there-
after.36 When secure resources are identically distributed across the two countries, they
face identical marginal benet and marginal cost functions for guns, thereby yielding the
symmetric equilibrium, point A in Figure 2 where Gi
F = e G
A for i = 1;2.37 What about
when secure endowments are unevenly distributed across the two countries? Provided that
35However, note that, as in the case of autarky, countries will not use their entire labor endowments in
the production of guns, provided that both factors are essential in the production of consumption goods.
36The absence of strategic complementarity at the 45
 line here, in contrast to the case of autarky (see
footnote 23 and the expression for @B
i
A=@G
j shown in (A.15) in the Appendix), is due to the previously
noted absence of any indirect inuence of guns by an adversary through the the relative price, p
i = . In
the case of free trade,  is given by world markets.
37As before, point (0;0) is not an equilibrium. That the level of arming by both countries under free trade,
19the distribution is such that free trade in consumption goods implies international factor
price equalization38 and such that the production of guns does not exhaust either country's
secure land resources, the contending states will continue to face identical marginal benet
and marginal cost functions for guns, thus again yielding the symmetric Nash equilibrium:
Gi
F = e G
A.
Let us now reect on the conditions that induce this type of equilibrium.39 Continue
to assume that  = e p
A and that the degree of land insecurity is suciently small so that
S0 in Fig. 3 contains unequal distributions of secure resources across the two countries as
well as the equal distribution, and the parallelogram C1J1C2J2 in Fig. 4 (which is similar
to Fig. 3) captures the joint sectoral decomposition of inputs in the consumption goods
sectors of the two contestants. Since Gi
F = e G
A for i = 1;2 at  = e p
A, we can temporarily
abstract from resource constraints in the production of guns, and view C1C2 as the vector of
residual factor supplies of an integrated economy (i.e., an economy in which both goods and
factors are tradable); this integrated economy replicates the equilibrium that arises when
where there is free trade in goods only, countries 1 and 2 are considered separately, and
their residual factor endowments are in C1J1C2J2 (Dixit and Norman, 1980; Helpman and
Krugman, 1985). Under these circumstances, trade in consumption goods causes factor
prices to be equalized internationally for all residual resource distributions in C1J1C2J2.
But, country i's secure factor endowments must, at the same time, cover the vector of
resources that are absorbed in its arms sector, O1C1 = O2C2.40 Therefore, the set of secure
endowment distributions that are consistent with international factor price equalization and
unconstrained production of guns is the shaded hexagon in Fig. 4, which we label the \arms





F for i = 1;2, equals that which emerges under autarky assuming identical adversaries, e G

A, is due
to our (benchmark) assumption that  = e p

A. Below we show how changes in  inuence the level of arming
by both countries.
38The conditions for international factor price equalization include, as in the standard Hechscker-Ohlin
trade model, constant returns to scale in production, the absence of factor intensity reversals, identical
technologies across countries, diversication in production, absence of market failures or distortions, no
trade barriers, and the existence of at least as many productive factors in the tradable goods sectors as there
are traded goods (Samuelson, 1949).
39To be sure, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium arise under less restrictive conditions than the ones
stated in Theorem 2. Indeed, the analysis could be extended to entertain the possibilities that factor prices
are not equalized internationally and the production of guns is constrained by the countries' secure land
holdings. However, since these possibilities only complicate the analysis without altering the key insights of
our comparison of conict under autarky and free trade, we choose not to treat them formally here.
40Note that the upper boundaries of the (shaded) sets of distributions for which the countries' secure land
holdings bind are humped shaped under autarky (see Fig. 3), since dierent distributions imply dierent
product and thus factor prices, which then change each country's incentive to arm. By contrast, the upper





(though similarly passing through F
1 and F
2), since world product prices pin down factor prices and thus
incentives to arm.








2, at least one
country will specialize in the production of one consumption good. Such specialization precludes the pos-
20Corollary 1. Under free trade, redistributions of secure endowments across the two con-
tending countries within the AES have no eect on their arming. Thus, the welfare eects
of such redistributions coincide with the factor price related changes in national income
weighted by the marginal utility of income.
As before, the welfare eects of endowment redistributions can be visualized by con-
sidering a transfer of labor or land from country j to country i (6= j). A welfare decom-
position similar to that in (11), noting that the strategic eect of such a transfer van-
ishes since there is no eect on equilibrium arming, yields the following for the case of
a transfer of labor: dV i
F =dLi =  dV i
F =dLi = ()w(). Similarly one can verify that
dV i
F =dKi =  dV i
F =dKi = ()r().
The next proposition outlines the eects of an increase in the degree of land insecurity|
namely, an increase in K0 and a decrease in the countries' secure land endowments, such
that dKi =  idK0|in the free trade regime, where initially arms are equalized across the
contending nations.
Proposition 4. (Degree of Insecurity under Free Trade) For initial factor distributions in


































Increasing the degree of insecurity in the free trade regime adds, as in the autarkic
regime, to the marginal benet of arming (MBi). Furthermore, as in the autarkic regime,
there is no eect on the marginal cost of arming, (MCi
F). However, the reason here is
somewhat dierent. In particular, because product prices alone determine factor prices
under free trade, MCi
F is a constant function; a change in K0 has no eect on MCi
F.42 For
an initial distribution in the AES, the positive eect on MBi is the same for both countries.
Hence, each country's best-response function increases, and by the same amount, resulting
in a higher equilibrium level of arming. Since total endowments have not changed, the
amount of resources diverted from production of consumption goods falls, and so does
sibility of international factor price equalization and renders a country's marginal cost of producing guns





but outside the AES, free trade in consumption goods leads to factor price equalization. Although one
country's secure land constraint binds in the production of guns, once the disputed land is divided, both
countries diversify in their production of the two goods. Nonetheless, due to that binding constraint, the
marginal benet of producing more arms is not equalized across countries; accordingly, free trade does not
lead to arms equalization.
42Recall that, under autarky, the eect of an increase in the degree of insecurity has no direct eect on the
price, since the condition that dK
i =  
idK0 implies no change in the countries' residual land endowments.
Thus, there is no eect on the positioning of MC
i
A.
21income. Thus, the eects of increasing the degree of insecurity are qualitatively the same
under the two trade regimes, where the distribution of secure resources implies equalized
arming incentives (S0 under autarky and the AES under free trade).43 This discussion
suggests further that increasing the degree of insecurity shrinks the AES.
The size of the AES relative to the set of possible secure endowment distributions
provides a measure of the likelihood that free trade will equalize arms internationally. This
measure depends not only on the degree of land insecurity, but also on the world price and
the nature of technology. Ceteris paribus, the greater is the degree of similarity between the
consumption goods technologies (i.e., the smaller is jki
2 ki
1j) and the larger is the deviation
of the international price () from the autarkic price, (e p
A), the smaller is the factor price
equalization set and thus the smaller is the AES. Indeed, it is possible for the AES to
contain only the equal distribution.44
But, for unequal distributions in the AES, free trade in consumption goods levels the
playing eld in arms competition and equalizes power internationally. We thus have again,
as in the case of autarky, the emergence of (the \strong version" of) the paradox of power
(Hirshleifer, 1991)|where the relatively less auent adversary devotes a larger fraction of
its income to arms and obtains an equal share of the disputed resource|but for a potentially
larger set of factor distributions, particularly when  = e p
A.
What are the implications of changes in international prices for arming, trade ows and
welfare?45 We address these questions in the following three propositions. To proceed, note
43However, for distributions in the AES subset of S
0, the eects are more pronounced in the free trade
regime, as can be illustrated in the context of Fig. 1, which shows the representative country's marginal
benet and cost schedules, assuming  = e p

A, so that initially G
i
F = e G

A. Since the marginal benet schedule
of arming is trade-regime independent, an increase in insecurity shifts this schedule upward by the same
amount under both regimes, and at the same time leaves the countries' marginal cost schedules under the
two regimes unchanged. However, because MC
i
A is increasing in G
i, while MC
i
F is independent of G
i, each
country's response under autarky is less than that under free trade. As a result, an increase in insecurity
increases the Nash equilibrium quantities of guns by more under free trade (where  is unchanged) than
under autarky. Since the change in insecurity has no eect on the countries' ex post secure endowments,
only the strategic eect matters, implying that welfare will fall by more under free trade than under autarky
for initial distributions in S
0.
44Nonetheless, there always exist combinations of technologies, secure factor distributions, degrees of land
insecurity, and world prices that preclude this possibility.
45It is important to note that, when  diers from e p

A, Fig. 4 will change considerably. To get some
sense of these changes, suppose that  increases above e p

A, but only by a small amount to ensure continued





in  reduces the wage/rental rate ratio, !
i, in each country i. The implied changes in factor prices, in
turn, reduce the land intensity (i.e., the land/labor ratio demanded) in each sector (including guns), thereby
attening the sides of the hexagon and the vectors O
iC
i for i = 1;2. Furthermore, the increase in ,
by Proposition 5(a) below, increases each country's incentive to produce more guns, to increase the set of
distributions for which the counties' secure land resources bind, as well as guns production by both countries.
At the same time, with guns being labor-intensive, by Lemma A2(d), k

X increases above e k

X. Thus, the line
C
1C
2 going through point D becomes steeper and no longer coincides with S
0 in Fig. 3 (for autarky). The
only common point will be point D.
22that, for each country i, there exists a range of prices (i;i) that ensures diversication in
the production of consumption goods for country i. Then, for world prices  2 (;), where
 = maxf1;2g and  = minf1;2g, production is diversied in both countries i. By
contrast, for world prices  = 2 (;), where   minf1;2g   and   maxf1;2g  ,
both countries specialize in production.46 Using these denitions, we have the following:
Proposition 5. (International Prices and Arming)
(a) Assuming that secure land endowments are not exhausted in the production of guns,
equilibrium guns are increasing in the world price of the land-intensive good for world
prices  2 (;) (i.e., dGi
F =d ? 0 8 2 (;) if ki
2 ? ki
1, for i = 1;2).
(b) Equilibrium guns are invariant to price changes for all world prices  = 2 (;) (i.e.,
dGi
F =d = 0, 8 = 2 (;)).
To x ideas, suppose good 2 is land-intensive (ki
2 > ki
1) and that the conditions specied
in part (a) are satised. Thus, factor prices and arms are equalized across countries. Now,
let the world price of good 2 () rise. While this price change has no eect on either country's
marginal benet of arming (MBi), by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Lemma A1(a)) the
wage/rental ratio in each contending country (!i) will fall; and, as discussed previously in
connection with Lemma 1(c), this factor price adjustment causes each country i's marginal
cost of arming (MCi
F) to fall, thereby inducing both to arm more heavily. Analogous
reasoning establishes that, in the case good 1 is land-intensive (ki
1 > ki
2), an increase in
 2 (;) induces less arming. Turning to part (b), note that, from equations (2){(5), price
changes outside the relevant range for country i,  = 2 (i;i), force all factor prices to rise
proportionately in that country and thus have no eect on the marginal cost of arming.
Part (b), then, follows from the condition imposed that imply neither country diversies
in production. But, for our purposes, the important point is that changes in the world
price can have important implications for security policies when production is diversied.
Furthermore, the qualitative linkage hinges on the nature of technology. For simplicity and
clarity, henceforth we maintain the assumption that good 2 is land-intensive|i.e., ki
2 > ki
1.
Proposition 5 can be illustrated with the help of Fig. 5, which assumes identical adver-
saries. The positively sloped blue dashed-line curve identies the equilibrium gun quantity
as implicitly dened by (9), G() (read along the horizontal axis), that each adversary will
produce as a function of  (read along the vertical axis) under free trade.47 The extensions
of G() in the shaded regions of specialization show the independence of equilibrium guns
46Of course, for identical adversaries,  =  and  = . But, for adversaries having dierent secure factor
endowments, there also exist price ranges for which one country's gun choices depend on prices while the
other country's do not|namely, (;) and (;). However, these complications are not relevant for our
arguments.
47Ignore the other curves for now.
23from the world price noted in part (b).48
Naturally, the direction of a country's trade ows will depend on world prices. To
explore this issue, dene i
A as the world price level that eliminates country i's trade. The
next proposition describes the relationship between trade eliminating prices and autarkic
prices and the direction of trade ows.
Proposition 6. (International Prices and Trade Flows) For each adversary i, there is a
world price, i
A, such that Mi
F () Q 0 if  R i
A. Furthermore, for factor distributions in
the AES subset of S0; we have i
A = e p
A; but, under the maintained assumption that good







A (j 6= i).
The interesting part of Proposition 6 is that, in the presence of dierences in secure
factor ownership, a contending country's trade eliminating price, i
A, diers from the price
that emerges under autarky, pi
A. The key to understanding this result is to note that the
introduction of free trade, through its impact on arming incentives, alters the countries'
residual factor endowments and therefore their excess demand functions. To see the logic
here, suppose  = p2
A and consider a distribution of secure resources in the AES subset
of S1, where country 1 is relatively more aggressive under autarky. By Proposition 1(b),
the autarkic conictual equilibrium can be identied with point A0 in Fig. 2. Since free
trade levels the playing eld in arms competition and, as a result, induces country 2 to
become more aggressive and country 1 to become less aggressive (compare the free trade
equilibrium at point A with the autarkic equilibrium at point A0), country 2's residual
land/labor ratio, k2
X, increases with a move to free trade (Lemmas A2(b) and A3).49 By
Lemma A1(b), assuming that ki
2 > ki
1, country 2's excess supply of the non-numeraire
good, when evaluated at the autarkic price, p2
A , is strictly positive. As such, the world
price that eliminates trade, 2
A, must be below p2
A . Similar logic shows that, at the same
time, 1
A > p1
A .50 These results prove useful in the next section, where we discuss the
broader implications of conict for trade patterns.














, for i = 1;2 and j 6= i. (12)
The rst term inside the brackets, weighted by the marginal utility of income (()), cap-
tures the direct welfare eect of a price change, and its sign is determined by the country's
48Note the equality of guns produced by the two countries in these shaded regions arises because the gure
is drawn under the assumption that the countries are identical in their secure resource endowments.
49Lemma A2(b) shows @k
i
X=@G




always in the neighborhood of an optimum when G
i  G
j and nearly always otherwise.








A for each country.
24trade pattern. It is positive for net exporters of the non-numeraire good (Mi
F < 0), and
negative for net importers (Mi
F > 0). The second term (again weighted by ()) captures
the strategic welfare eect of a price change. By the properties of the CSF and Proposition
5(a) under the maintained assumption that ki
2 > ki
1, this indirect eect is negative when
arms are equalized internationally; but, by Proposition 5(b), the eect vanishes when the
world price rises above  or falls below . The next proposition takes these ideas one step
further.
Proposition 7. (International Prices and Welfare) A contending country i's welfare is
(a) decreasing in the world price, in the neighborhood of  = i




(b) minimized at a world price,  = i
min (> i
A).
Part (a) points out that an improvement in a contending country's terms of trade is
necessarily \immiserizing" if the country exports the disputed-resource-intensive product
and provided that  does not dier considerably from its trade eliminating price, i
A. The
idea here is simple, building on the two welfare eects of an increase in the world price
revealed by equation (12). Specically, in the neighborhood of i
A, the direct, positive eect
of a terms of trade improvement for country's i income is swamped by the loss in income
due to its opponent's increased aggressiveness.
Part (b) indicates that a country's welfare is minimized at some price, i
min > i
A, where
the benecial, direct eect of a terms of trade improvement equals the adverse strategic eect
that results from increased arms production by the rival country. This nding establishes
the existence of a range of prices, (i
A;i
min), under which terms of trade improvements
are welfare-reducing for a country immersed in conict. Thus, international conict over
resources can expose contending countries with an apparent comparative advantage in the
contested-resource-intensive products to the \resource curse" problem. While others have
shown that the problem can be attributed to domestic rent-seeking (e.g., Torvik, 2002;
Mehlum et al. 2006), redistributive politics (e.g., Robinson et al., 2005), and domestic
conict (Garnkel et al., 2008), our nding suggests that the absence and/or ineectiveness
of international institutions aimed at managing international conict has a bearing on this
problem as well.51
Although country size is inconsequential in the determination of the quantity of guns
that adversaries produce under free trade for initial factor distributions in the AES, country
size can play an important role in the determination of the range of international prices




1, but analogous results emerges when the factor intensity
ranking is reversed. The general point is that increases in the relative price of the good produced intensively
with land is welfare reducing for prices close to the trade eliminating price.
25for which the resource curse problem arises. Consider, for example, an uneven distribution
of secure resources in the AES subset of S0|or, more precisely, a point such as E in
Fig. 4, where country 1 is larger than country 2 and where initially  = i
A = e p
A. From
(12), the strategic welfare eect of an increase in the world price, , above e p
A (the second
term in (12)) will not dier across adversaries. However, the marginal benet from such
a price increase (the rst term in (12)) will dier. Since, by construction, country 1 is
larger than country 2, country 1 will be relatively more involved in trade than its rival (i.e.,
 M1
F >  M2
F > 0) for  > e p
A; therefore, 1
min < 2
min, and we have the following:
Corollary 2. For uneven factor distributions in S0, the relatively smaller adversary will
experience the resource curse problem over a larger range of international prices.
4 Trade Patterns and Trade Volumes
By inducing countries to allocate resources in the production of arms, international contes-
tation of resources alters a country's residual factor endowments (ki
X) and can thus aect its
observed comparative advantage. In this section, we contribute two ideas to the literature.
First, we illustrate how the presence of conict can distort a contending country's compar-
ative advantage. Second, we show that a simple comparison of international and autarkic
prices need not provide an accurate prediction of trade patterns in contending countries.
To consider the eects of conict on a contending country's comparative advantage, it is
instructive to focus on identical adversaries and show how their trade pattern (with conict)
compares to the (hypothetical) trade pattern we would observe if property were secure and
there were no arming. We illustrate the key ideas with the help of Fig. 5. As noted
earlier, the curve G() depicts the equilibrium choice of guns under free trade as a function
of price. The downward sloping solid-line curve, pA(G), shows the negative dependence
of the representative country's autarkic price on the common quantity of guns, G. This
relationship follows from Lemma 3(c), with the assumptions that good 2 is land-intensive
and that the ratio of a country's ex post endowment of land to its secure endowment of
labor, ki 
Ki+iK0
Li , exceeds its land/labor ratio used in the production of guns, ki
G(!).
Alternatively, if ki < ki
G(!) while ki
2 > ki
1, then pA(G) would be increasing in G.52
Point A, where G() and pA(G) intersect, identies the conictual equilibrium under
autarky. Clearly, if  = e p
A, point A would also describe the conictual equilibrium under
free trade. By Proposition 6 and our assumption that the contenders are identical, the
52See again Lemma 3(c). The eect of the ranking of k
i and kG(!) on the qualitative relation between G
and pA(G) has to do with its eect on qualitative relation between the representative country's guns and its
residual land/labor ratio, k
i






G), an exogenous equi-proportionate
increase in guns produced by both countries, where initially G
i = G
j, increases (decreases) k
i
X, which in




1) a decrease (an increase) in the
trade eliminating price A.
26international price that eliminates a contending country's trade ows equals the equilibrium
price that obtains under autarky (i.e., i
A = e p
A); therefore, under conict and trade, both
adversaries will export the land-intensive good (2) if  > e p
A and will import it if  < e p
A.
Consider now the hypothetical case of no arming. From the specication of the CSF
in (1), in this case each adversary would receive 1
2 of the contested resource K0, and the
autarkic price would coincide with price pn
A = pA(0) (superscript \n" stands for \no conict"
or \Nirvana"). Thus, in the absence of conict, the representative country would export the
land-intensive good (i.e., good 2) if  > pn
A and would import it if  < pn
A. Bringing these
ideas together, the following proposition claries how conict and the nature of technology
in arms interact to determine trade patterns.
Proposition 8. (Trade Patterns with Identical Adversaries) Suppose ki
2 > ki
1 and free
trade in goods leads to international arms equalization. Then, conict over land reverses
the contending countries' comparative advantage for  2 (e p
A;pn




A) if ki < ki
G(!); relative to what would be observed in the hypothetical case of
no conict.
As suggested in the proposition, the nature of the distortion depends on the relative
ranking of ki and ki
G(!). The reason is that this relative ranking determines the relative
ranking of autarkic prices under conict and under no conict, e p
A = pA(e G
A) and pn
A =
pA(0). Suppose, for example, ki > ki
G(!). In this case, as noted earlier and illustrated in
Fig. 5, pA(G) is decreasing in G, so that pn
A > e p
A. Now suppose  2 (e p
A;pn
A)|for example,
the world price  = 0 shown in Fig. 5. Obviously, since 0 < pn
A, under no conict both
contestants would import good 2. But, since 0 > e p
A at the same time, under conict each
country exports good 2, the good that employs the resource disputed resource. If instead
ki < ki
G(!), then as noted earlier pA(G) would be increasing in G, and as a result pn
A < e p
A.
In this case, if  2 (pn
A; e p
A), then each country would export good 2 in the hypothetical
case of no conict, and import the good under conict.53
Two observations are now in order. First, resource insecurity and the conict it engen-
ders can cause a country's natural comparative advantage to diverge from its comparative
advantage that would be observed in the hypothetical case of no conict|and as would be
predicted in the standard trade model.54 As we have just seen, the nature of technology
53An additional possibility (not considered in Proposition 8) is that an increase in guns production even-
tually reverses the ranking of between k
i and k
i
G(!). Suppose, for example that initially kG(!
i) < k
i, so
that pA(G) is initially decreasing in G. Then, as G rises, the induced decrease in the relative product price




1) implies an increase in the wage/rental ratio, !
i, which





i) could eventually rise above k
i. (This possibility does not arise if production functions are




A, there will exist price ranges
under which the presence of conict reverses a country's comparative advantage.
54The idea that a country's apparent comparative advantage depends on the nature of property rights is
reminiscent of a related point in Brander and Taylor (1997b) who show that, over time, the depletion of a
27and the world price play key roles in this regard. Second, it might be inappropriate to
view international conict over productive resources as a type of trade cost that necessarily
reduces the size of a contending country's trade ows. Suppose, for example,  = pn
A. Then,
in the absence of conict, the contestants would not engage in trade. But, as we have just
seen, in the presence of conict and under free trade, the contending countries will be net
exporters of the land-intensive good if ki > ki
G(!); consequently, depending on technology,
international conict may very well expand, rather than shrink, trade volumes.55
From the perspective of neoclassical trade theory, a country's trade pattern is determined
by comparing the world price to its autarkic price. However, in the world of insecure
property and international conict, an unqualied application of this logic can lead to
erroneous inferences about trade patterns. In other words, insecure property and conict
over resources might not only alter trade patterns but also the standard logic we normally
use in trade theory to predict trade patterns.
Proposition 9. (Trade Patterns with Dierent Sized Adversaries) If the distribution of
secure factors diers across countries, then, in the presence of international conict,
(a) it might not be possible to determine a contending country's trade pattern simply by
comparing the international price to its autarkic price;
(b) a contending country need not export the good that employs intensively its relatively
abundant factor.
We establish the validity of Proposition 9 informally and with the help of Proposition 6,
which shows the price that eliminates a country's trade diers from its autarkic price (i.e.,
i
A 6= pi
A) for factor distributions in the AES subset of Si. Consider such a distribution of
resources. Clearly, if arming did not depend on the trade regime considered and if  = pi
A,
country i would not engage in trade. However, as was argued above, the trade regime does
inuence arming that, in turn, drives a wedge between each country's autarkic price and
its trade eliminating price. In short, the direction of trade ows is not determined by how
the international price () diers from the country's autarkic price, pi
A, but rather how it
diers from i
A.
To see the logic behind part (b), suppose  = e p
A and consider point H in Fig. 4. At this
distribution, since  = e p
A < 1
A, country 1 will export the labor-intensive good; and, since
 = e p
A > 2
A, country 2 will export the land-intensive good. But, at point H, country 1 is
land-abundant and country 2 is labor-abundant, both in terms of their secure endowments
common-pool resource in a country with ill-dened property rights can reverse its comparative advantage. In
our setting, residual factor endowments (and thus comparative advantage) can change because the dissipation
of resources in conict is trade-regime dependent.
55The relationship between the volume of trade and conict has been addressed empirically in the political
science literature (e.g., Barbieri, 2002), which appears to nd support for the idea that conict might
stimulate trade.
28and in terms of their nal endowments under free trade, which conrms part (b).56
5 Comparison of Trade Regimes
In this section, we illustrate the following two ideas: (i) the eects of resource insecurity
and competition to establish property rights on arming incentives depend on the trade
regime in place; and, (ii) the costs of arming can overwhelm a country's traditional gains
from trade. The analysis not only claries how international conict generates a trade-
regime dependent distortion (Bhagwati, 1971), but also sheds light on the conditions under
which free trade intensies this distortion. To substantiate these points we consider two
possibilities: (i) when adversaries are identical, which unveils the gist of the argument and
the circumstances under which autarky dominates trade; and, (ii) when adversaries have
dierent endowment proles, which sheds some light on the conditions under which national
preferences over trade regimes can diverge.
Proposition 10. (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Identical Adversaries) If free trade
in consumption goods induces adversaries with identical endowment proles to
(a) export the land-intensive commodity, then the adversaries will arm more heavily
under free trade than under autarky, and free trade will be Pareto dominated by
autarky for a certain range of international prices;
(b) import the land-intensive product, there will be less arming under free trade than
under autarky, and free trade will Pareto dominate autarky.
Proposition 10 holds regardless of the ranking of the relative land-intensities of the two
goods. But, for clarity we again assume ki
2 > ki
1, and illustrate the proposition with the
help of Fig. 5. Recall point A depicts the conictual equilibrium under autarky and the
corresponding equilibrium under free trade is on G(). Then, as illustrated in the gure,
for  > e p
A, where the adversaries export the land-intensive good (2), a move from autarky
to free trade intensies the conict between them, inducing more arming. By contrast, for
 < e p
A, where the adversaries import the land-intensive good, a discrete move to free trade
from autarky weakens the conict, and thus induces less arming.57
Turning to payos, we begin by characterizing the shape of welfare contours in the (G;)
space. First note that, regardless of the trade regime considered, equi-proportionate arms




A at point H, the land- (labor-) intensive commodity does not
necessarily command the smaller (larger) autarkic price in the land- (labor-) abundant country.
57Note the dierence between this result and that of Hirshleifer (1991), who explored the linkages between
conict over output, identifying market integration with the degree of complementarity between the inputs
in useful production. Specically, he observed that the diversion of resources into arms falls with the degree
of market integration, although the size of this eect is small. Our approach suggests that, when conict
is over resources and market integration takes the form of a move from more protected (autarky) to less
protected (free trade) trade regimes, the severity of conict (measured by the level of arming) can rise or fall
depending on, among other things, technology, the degree of resource insecurity and international prices.
29increases do not alter the division of the contested land but raise resource costs. As such,
the representative country's welfare is decreasing in guns, G. Now observe that, for given
guns, a country's welfare increases with the deviation of the world price from its autarky
level pA(G) (Lemma 1(d)). It follows, then, that a contestant's welfare contours will have
the shape indicated in Fig. 5, with contours further to the right indicating lower welfare
levels for the two contestants. Noting that each contestant exports the contested-resource-
intensive product at prices  > e p
A, Fig. 5 illustrates that autarky will Pareto dominate free
trade for all international prices within the (e p
A;0) interval, but not for prices beyond 0.58
The gure also shows that free trade is Pareto superior to autarky when countries import
the land-intensive product.
Now consider adversaries with dierent endowment proles. Arbitrary factor distribu-
tions in Si can complicate the welfare ranking of trade regimes for at least two reasons.
First, because adversaries begin to specialize in production at dierent international prices,
it becomes necessary to investigate arming incentives outside the AES for one country ini-
tially and eventually for both. Second, the endogeneity of trade patterns together with the
fact that V i
F 6= V i
A at  = pi
A for arbitrary distributions in Si make it dicult to identify
workable benchmarks for comparison purposes. Still, as the next proposition illustrates,
there exist two noteworthy asymmetries that yield tractable comparisons.
Proposition 11. (Relative Appeal of Free Trade with Dierent Sized Adversaries)
(a) For any uneven factor distribution in the AES subset of S0, there exists a range of
international prices that render autarky Pareto superior to free trade.
(b) If  = e p
A, there exist subsets Di  Si of factor distributions adjacent to the AES of
S0 such that one country prefers autarky over free trade while its adversary does not.
Part (a) is an extension of Proposition 10 to uneven distributions in the AES subset of
S0. Part (b) claries how countries' preferences over trade regimes might dier when more
general factor endowment asymmetries are considered. As shown in the proof (presented
in the Appendix), the key to the divergence in preferences is the presence of a strategic
eect when redistributing resources under autarky (Proposition 2), and the absence of such
a strategic eect under free trade (Corollary 1).
6 Trade Policies
Thus far, we have studied the consequences of trade regimes, taking those regimes as ex-
ogenous and, in particular, abstracting from the possibility that policymakers can choose to
intervene with trade policy. In this section, we illustrate how a country might use its trade







1) is dened as the international price that satises V
i
F () = e V

A.
30policy to tilt the distribution of power to its favor. We also highlight the welfare eects of
alternative trade policy choices.
Suppose country i intervenes in trade with an ad valorem trade tax, i, on good 2|i.e.,
requiring i > 0 when Mi > 0, and i < 0 when Mi < 0. Under these circumstances,
pi = (1 + i) > 0 for i = 1;2. Assuming that, in each country i, tari revenues, iMi =
(pi   )Mi, are redistributed to consumers in lump-sum fashion, the country's income
for consumption purposes, denoted by Y i, equals the revenue generated from producing
consumption goods plus tari revenues, Y i = Ri + (pi   )Mi; and, the indirect utility
function is now given by V (pi;Y i) = (pi)[Ri +(pi  )Mi]. Observe that Di =  V i
p=V i
Y =
 0(pi)Y i=(pi) and (as before) Xi
2 = Ri
p. Accordingly, we can extend the decomposition
of country i's welfare as follows:
dV i = (pi)

 Mid + idMi +
 
riK0i




for i = 1;2 (j 6= i). The above equation delineates the channels through which security
and trade policies aect welfare. The rst and second terms inside the brackets reect the
familiar terms of trade and volume of trade eects, respectively. By our assumption that
countries 1 and 2 are \small" in world markets, the rst term will vanish when the eects
of trade and security policies are considered. However, if country i participates in world
trade, the second term will not vanish; instead, since country i's excess demand for good 2
can be written as Mi  Mi(;i;Gi;Gj), this eect will depend on country i's trade and
security policies as well as on its adversary j's security (but not trade) policy. The third
and fourth terms in (13) capture the direct eects of security policies discussed earlier.
Now suppose country i chooses its trade and security policies simultaneously. Since
@=@i = 0 by virtue of the fact that country i is \small," we have dM = (@Mi=@i)di,
where @Mi=@i < 0. If Mi > 0, an increase in i, where initially i > 0, reduces tari
revenues and therefore income. By the same token, if Mi < 0, a decrease in i where
initially i  0, reduces tax revenues. It follows, then, that country i's optimal trade policy
is necessarily free trade (i.e., i = 0), which implies the second term in (13) also vanishes.
As such, country i's optimal security policy coincides with the one described earlier in the
context of free trade. Since this argument is true for both adversaries, a policy of free trade
coupled with the security policies of previous sections constitute the Nash equilibrium of
the extended game of trade and security policies. Hence, when free trade is an option yet
Pareto dominated by autarky, countries might nd themselves locked into a \prisoner's
dilemma" situation, relative to the case where trade is foreclosed. One can also verify that,
if security policies are determined prior to trade policies, this result remains intact.
Do trade policy commitments prior to the implementation of security policies alter the
31analysis in a substantive way? To explore this possibility, consider a two-stage game, in
which countries choose their trade policies in stage 1 and their security policies in stage 2.
The key dierence here from our analysis of security policies alone in the previous sections
is that, in the presence of trade taxes (i), country i's optimal security policy will factor in
its possible impact on the volume of trade. Starting with stage 2, at an interior solution,







Gi    i

= 0; for i = 1;2: (14)
Keeping in mind that we can write Mi  Mi(;i;Gi;Gj), the eects of trade policy on
arming and power can be identied with standard comparative statics exercises performed
on (14). Such an analysis, however, would take us o track. For our purposes, the key point
is that trade policy precommitments can strategically aect the security policies of small
countries.
To proceed, identify with an asterisk () the solution to the above system of equations
and let subscript T indicate the presence of taris/taxes. For simplicity and clarity, suppose
country i imports good 2, so that trade policy takes the form of taris. Now consider country
i's stage-1 problem. Appealing to the envelope theorem, the welfare eects of a change in



















for i = 1;2 (j 6= i). (15)
The direct eect of an increase in country i's taris, shown in the rst term inside the square
brackets of (15), is to reduce its volume of imports (i.e., @Mi=@i < 0), which adversely
aects income and thus welfare for i > 0. However, there also exists a strategic eect,
arising from the possible impact of the country's trade policy on the rival country's security
policy. Represented by the second term inside the square brackets, this strategic eect has
two components. To x ideas, suppose as before that ki
2 > ki
1. Then, an increase in Gj,
which reduces the quantity of land appropriated by country i, tends to raise its reliance
on imports of the land-intensive good 2: @Mi=@Gj > 0 for i = 1;2 (i 6= j). But, assume
further that a more restrictive trade policy by country i (i.e., an increase in i > 0) induces
its adversary to behave less aggressively in security competition (i.e., @G
j
T =@i < 0).59
In this case, the rst component of the strategic eect is negative. At the same time,
59Characterizing the commitment eects of trade agreements (multilateral, as under the WTO, or prefer-
ential, as under the EU and Mercosur), on security policies is an interesting and important research question
in its own right. While the terms of trade eects of such agreements have been emphasized in the literature
(e.g., Bagwell and Staiger (2002)), the commitment eects of trade agreements, particularly in the context
of security policies could be relevant as well. We leave this issue for future research.
32however, the second component is positive because i
Gj < 0 (a direct income eect). While
identifying precisely the implications for taris requires additional work, one thing is clear.
If the strategic welfare eect of trade policy is positive overall, then there exists an additional
rationale for precommitted intervention in trade (e.g., trade agreements) for small countries.
7 Concluding Remarks
In the decades leading up to World War I, the proportion of world trade to world GDP
reached unprecedented magnitudes (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2000). Yet, international
conict ensued with much ferocity and despite expectations to the contrary.60 Similarly,
the expansion of trade in the post World War II era has been spectacular. Still, while
interstate conict might have subsided over this latter period, insecurity and contention
continue to are up in many parts of the world. Whereas not all disputes can be considered
to have material causes, there is no doubt that contestation of water resources, land, oil,
diamonds and other resources by dierent countries has at least some role to play in many
international disputes and drives the military expenditures and security policies of the
countries that are involved in such disputes. Moreover, as Findlay and O'Rourke (2007)
show in their magisterial survey of the Eurasia's economic history, military competition for
resources and the expansion of world trade were inextricably linked over the whole of the
past millenium, and it would be unlikely that such links will be absent in the future.
The extent to which disputed resources or the goods they produce are tradable can
thus have implications for the security policies that countries pursue and the costs those
countries realize as a result. In turn, these security costs can vary with the trade regime in
such a way so as to possibly outweigh the gains from trade. We have examined the issues
emanating from such a setting using the neoclassical trade model, augmented by a disputed
resource that is costly to contest.
To assess the implications of trade openness for arming, power, trade patterns, and wel-
fare, we have analyzed two polar trade regimes: autarky and free trade. The key dierence
between these regimes for small countries is that prices are endogenously determined under
autarky but not under free trade. Under either regime, the most auent country need not
be the most powerful one. Still, arming incentives are trade-regime dependent. One striking
result is that there exist circumstances under which free trade equalizes arming incentives
across contending states and thereby levels the playing eld in arms competition.
Depending on the level of world prices, free trade in consumption goods might intensify
arming incentives to generate additional security costs that swamp the traditional gains from
60The prediction before World War I, for example, that war was impossible or unthinkable|because
Britain and Germany had become so economically interdependent that conict was viewed as "commercial
suicide" (Angell, 1933)|was atly contradicted by experience.
33trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, in
the presence of international conict, a country's apparent comparative advantage can dier
from its natural comparative advantage (absent insecurity) and comparisons of autarkic
prices to world prices could be inappropriate predictors of trade patterns. This nding
suggests that empirical work aiming to relate trade volumes to fundamentals would be
incomplete if it did not include insecurity and contestation of resources.
With a focus on small countries, the analysis ignores the possible terms of trade eects
in security policy that would be especially relevant for those countries having monopoly
or monopsony power in world trade. Accordingly, it would be worthwhile to extend the
analysis in that direction. One important dierence from the current setting is that free
trade in consumption goods need not equalize arming incentives even when factor prices
are equalized and guns production is unconstrained. Another dierence is that trade and
security policies could be used simultaneously, the former to balance the terms of trade
eects with the volume of trade eects, and the latter for security considerations. Such
an extension of the basic model would be a rich and promising environment within which
to explore the implications of policy interactions, including the economics of free trade
agreements and their possible interactive eects with national security.
The model presented here could be fruitfully extended in a number of other ways.
For example, the analysis could assign an active role to the rest of the world (ROW).
Furthermore, the analysis could be generalized to situations where trade does not necessarily
result in the equalization of factor prices, and thus give a meaningful role to the possibility
of trade in arms. Last but not least, policy objectives could be specied to consider the
role of politics.
Ultimately, solving the problem of insecurity entails the design and development of
commitment devices that can reduce, and possibly eliminate, the need to arm. Such com-
mitment devices, however, are not easy to come by and, judging from particular historical
instances, they take a long time to develop. Europe is a good example of this. After the
experience of the two world wars, the original six members of the European Community
slowly began to develop mechanisms of economic integration that were, in large part, in-
stitutions of conict management. This twin process of economic integration and conict
resolution through bureaucratic and political struggle, instead of conict in the battleeld,
is ongoing and far from complete, even after a century of tribulations. Trade openness and,
more generally, economic interdependence might help to ameliorate conict, but it would
be naive to think that promoting such interdependence could achieve this by itself.
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37A Appendix
We rst present several useful properties of the CSF in (1). For convenience, dene
fi  f(Gi), where from our previous assumptions f0
i > 0 and f00
i  0. Now, dierenti-















i (f1 + f2)   2(f0






(f1 + f2)3 R 0 if Gi R Gj (A.4)
Lemma A1. If production in a country is diversied (i.e., Xi
j > 0, for both countries
i = 1;2 and both goods j = 1;2), then
(a)
@!i=@pi














Proof: Following Jones (1965), we denote the shares of factor h = K;L in the cost of










r= i and i
LG  wi i
w= i indicate the corresponding cost shares in guns. Now denote the
amount of land and labor employed in industry j = 1;2 respectively by Ki
j and Li
j. Then,
these quantities as a fraction of resources remaining once land and labor for producing guns







let a percentage change be indicated by a hat (^) over the associated variable (e.g., b x = dx
x ).



























































h=K;L hj = 1 for j = 1;2 by denition, the determinant of the coecient
matrix above, denoted by

i



















 ? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
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From (A.6), then, we have pi!i
p=!i = piwi
p=wi  piri
p=ri =  1=jij 7 0 when ki
2 ? ki
1, which
completes the proof to part (a).






Then, following the strategy above in part (a), we dierentiate (4) and (5) totally and solve







































































@ri being the (absolute value of the) elasticity of substitution between land and
labor in industry j;

i
 denotes the determinant of the coecient matrix obtained from
dierentiating (4) and (5); recalling
P
j=1;2 i























 ? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1:
Now, observe that b ki
X = b Ki
















Inspection of (A.7) conrms parts (b) and (c). k
In Lemma A1 the residual land/labor ratio, ki
X, is treated as exogenous. However, from
(6) it is clear that ki
X depends on price, guns, and factor supplies. The next lemma claries
this dependence.
Lemma A2. Let ki 
Ki+iK0













@Gi > 0; 8Gi that satisfy Ki
0i











@Gj R 0 if ki R ki
















X=Ri, and let i
G =  i i
wr= i
w i
r be the (absolute value of the)
elasticity of substitution between land and labor in the guns sector. Total dierentiation of

















































Parts (a){(c) & (e): The proofs follow from (A.8).
Part (d): Suppose Gi = Gj so that i
Gi =  i















Using the denitions of i
LG, si
L, and Ri, along with those for Ki
X and Li
X in (4) and (5),


































Inspection of this expression conrms part (d). k
Proof of Lemma 1.
Part (a): Dierentiate (9) with respect to Gi and use (A.3) to obtain
V i
GiGi = iriK0i
GiGi < 0. (A.10)
Part (b): Dierentiation of (8) with respect to Gj and use of (A.4) gives
V i
GiGj = iriK0i
GiGj R 0 if Gi R Gj. (A.11)
40Part (c): Recall that  i=ri =  (!i;1), implying that @( i=ri)=@pi =  i
w!i
p. Then, dier-
entiating (8) with respect to price and evaluating the resulting expression at the optimum
gives (by Lemma A1(a))
V i






















? 0 if ki
2 ? ki
1. (A.12)
Part (d): This is a standard property of indirect (trade) utility functions. k
Proof of Lemma 2. In (9) we can use (A.1) and (A.2) and the fact that MCi =  i=ri =











where, for simplicity, we have omitted stars. Now if ki
2 > ki
1, then by Lemma A1(a),
 (!(pi);1) is decreasing in pi; therefore, if p1 R p2, MC1=MC2 Q 1, which by the above





p > 0 (Lemma A1(a)), which implies MC1=MC2 R 1 if p1 R p2. But
then MB1=MB2 R 1 which requires G1 Q G2. k
Proof of Lemma 3. Let i
D > 0 be the elasticity of substitution in consumption. Focusing
on percentage changes, note that d RD
i
=  i
Db pi and that the expression for c RS
i
is given in



















The above relation and the denition of

i






1). Combining (A.8), which gives an expression for ^ ki











































Gi > 0: The proofs to parts (a){(d) now follow from
(A.13) and (A.8). k
Proof of Theorem 1.
41Existence: We establish existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, by showing that every
country i's payo function V i
A is strictly quasi-concave in its strategy, Gi. To do so, it
is sucient to show either that V i
A is strictly monotonic in Gi or that V i
A is rst strictly
increasing and then strictly decreasing over the agent's strategy space.
Let F(Ki
G;Li
G) be the production function for guns that is dual to the unit cost func-
tion  (wi;ri) and dene G
i  F(Ki;Li) as the level of guns produced with the country's
entire secure endowments of land and labor. Country i's strategy space is [0;G
i]. For
any Gj 2 [0;G
j], if Gi = G
i, country i (6= j) will not be able to produce either of the
consumption goods; therefore, V i
A(G
i;Gj) < V i
A(Gi;Gj) for any Gi 2 [0;G
i) which implies
that, under autarky, no country will use all of its resources to produce arms. Further-
more, since limGi!0 f0(Gi) = 1 by assumption, we must have @V i
A=@Gi > 0 as Gi ! 0.
By the continuity of V i
A in Gi, there will exist a best response function for each country
i, Bi
A(Gj)  minfGi 2 (0;G
i) j @V i
A=@Gi = 0g, with the property that @V i
A=@Gi > 0
8Gi < Bi
A(Gj). Thus, to establish strict quasi-concavity of V i
A in Gi we need only to prove
that @V i
A=@Gi < 0, 8Gi > Bi
A(Gj).
Suppose, on the contrary, that @V i
A=@Gi  0. Since V i
A must eventually fall to V i
A(G
i;Gj),
this supposition implies that V i
A must attain a local minimum at some Gi > Bi(Gj), which
would imply that @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 > 0. We now establish that this is not possible. Recalling
that pi
A = pi
A(Gi;Gj) under autarky and that !i = !(pi), we dierentiate (9) with respect























By Lemma 1(a), the rst term in the RHS of the above expression is negative regardless
of the ranking of factor intensities. Furthermore, by Lemmas 1(c) and 3(b), the product of
the expressions in the second term will also be negative.61 It follows that @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 < 0
at any Gi where @V i
A=@Gi = 0 regardless of the ranking of factor intensities. This proves
Bi
A(Gj) is unique and establishes the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Uniqueness: Having already established that guns production is bounded (i.e., Bi
A(Gj) 2
(0;G
i) for i = 1;2 (j 6= i), we can now establish uniqueness of equilibrium by showing that,
at any equilibrium point, the determinant of the Jacobian of the net marginal payos in (9)












@G2@G1 > 0 (Kolstad and Mathiesen, 1987).
Consider an equilibrium point where G1
A = B1
A(G2
A ) and G2
A = B1
A(G1
A ). From the
expression for jJj, it can be seen that, if the product of the slopes of the two countries'
61In (A.14) and below, the top signs in \
00 and \  "
















, is less than 1 at (G1
A ;G2
A ), then jJj > 0,
implying that this equilibrium is unique. The slope of country i's best-response function













































A=(@Gi)2 < 0 as shown above, the sign of @Bi
A=@Gj is determined by the sign
of @2V i
A=@Gi@Gj shown in the numerator of (A.15). Now, by Lemmas 1(c) and 3(b), the
second term of the numerator of the RHS of this expression is always positive. By Lemma
1(b), the rst term in the numerator is positive if Bi
A(Gj) > Gj (also see (A.11)), in
which case Gi is a strategic complement for Gj. However, if Bi
A(Gj) < Gj, then the rst
term is negative. Thus, when Bi
A(Gj) is suciently smaller than Gj, Gi can become a
strategic substitute for Gj. Furthermore, since 1
G1G2 =  2















. Therefore, we have two possibilities to
consider. Either (i) @Bi
A=@Gj > 0 and @B
j
A=@Gi  0 for i = 1;2 (j 6= i); or, (ii) @Bi
A=@Gj >














< 1 and thus jJj > 0.62




























The above expressions together with (A.10), (A.11, and (A.12) can be substituted into
















































A; therefore, if  i
A 2 (0;1) for i = 1;2, then jJj > 0. In case (ii),
both the numerator and the denominator of  i
A are positive, so  i





Gj]. From (A.1){(A.4), i = Gi[f0
i=fi   f00
i =f0
i] > 0. Then,
subtracting the numerator of  i
A from its denominator while using the denition of i
62Note that, in case (ii), jJj > 0 is also the condition for local stability of equilibrium.

























Clearly, a sucient condition for  i
A < 1 is that (A.17) is positive. Inspection of (A.17)
reveals that this is almost always true. Since the rst term and the coecient in front of
the second term are unambiguously positive, a sucient (but hardly necessary) condition
for  i










This condition is satised under a wide range of circumstances,63 including: (i) i
Gi  si
L,
which requires arms inputs not to be close complements; and (ii) i
LG  si
L (or, by (A.9),
ki > ki
G), which requires the guns sector to be suciently labor-intensive, regardless of
the degree of substitutability between inputs in arms. Either condition, along with the
boundary conditions established above, ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. k
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the logic behind part (a) was outlined in the main text,
here we prove part (b). A redistribution of a secure resource from country j to coun-
try i(6= j) expands (contracts) the \recipient" (\donor") country's resource endowment.















for H = L;K. Since @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 < 0, we have sign[dBi
A=dHi] = sign[@2V i
A=@Gi@Hi].

















A=dLi > 0 whereas dBi
A=dKi < 0. The signs of these derivatives imply that a
transfer of labor from one country to another increases (decreases) arms production by the
recipient (donor) for any given arms choice by the rival; yet, a transfer of land decreases
(increases) arms production by the recipient (donor). Thus, if we start with an arbitrary
secure endowment conguration in S0 and transfer a small amount of labor from country j
to country i or land from country i to country j, so that we end up somewhere in Si, the
properties of best-response functions ensure that at the new equilibrium we will necessarily




; 8 2 (0;1]), then 
i
G = 1 and 
i = 1, thus implying that the sucient condition
simplies to 1   s
i










Proof of Proposition 2. To identify the eects of endowment changes on equilibrium







































for Hi = Li;Ki where jJj > 0 and all expressions are evaluated at the equilibrium. Start
with an endowment distribution in S0, so that Gi
A = e G
A and pi
A = e p
A for i = 1;2. At such







@G2@G1 > 0 since by Lemma 1(b) V 1
G1G2 = V 2



















A 2 (0;1) by (A.15), (A.16) and the













@G2@K2 < 0 by (A.18) and the related
discussion.
Part (a): Consider a small transfer of labor from country 2 to country 1, so that  dL2 =


























Similar logic for land redistributions shows that dG1
A =dK1 =  dG2
A =dK1 < 0.
Part (b): This part is established by invoking symmetry and applying part (a) to (11) and
an analogous expression for the welfare eects of a change in land. k
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (a): Following the approach taken in the proof to Proposition 1, we dierentiate (9)
















A=(@Gi)2 ; for i = 1;2:
Since @2V i
A=(@Gi)2 < 0, we have sign[dBi
A=dK0] = sign[@2V i
A=@Gi@K0]. Now, dierentiat-






























for i = 1;2. The rst term, which simplies as (pi
A)r(pi
A)i
Gi, captures the eect an increase
in the degree of insecurity on country i's marginal benet of arming, and is clearly positive.
The second term represents the indirect eect through autarkic prices on the country's
marginal cost of arming. However, from (A.13) with the constraint that dKi =  idK0,
this eect is zero. Hence, sign[@2V i
A=@Gi@K0] = sign[dBi
A=dK0] > 0. Moreover, for an
initial distribution of secure resources in S0, the eect on the two countries' best response
functions will be the same, with a higher level of arming for both. To pin down this eect,








































Part (b): To identify the welfare implications, we extend the welfare decomposition in (8)
to include changes in K0 and Ki. Imposing the condition that dKi =  1
2dK0 and invoking




















for i = 1;2 (j 6= i);
By (A.21) and the properties of the CSF, this expression is the same for both i and is
negative. k
Proof of Theorem 2. The proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are similar
to those in Theorem 1 and are omitted. The proof of symmetry is outlined in the text. k
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is similar to that for Proposition 3 and is thus omitted.
k
Lemma A3. For given  and a factor distribution in the AES subset of Si; a country's







, will change as follows along its free
46trade best-response function, Bi




























(a) If Gi  Gj, then dki
X=dGjjGi=Bi
F(Gj) < 0;
(b) If Gi > Gj, then dki
X=dGjjGi=Bi
F(Gj) < 0 almost always. A sucient (but hardly
necessary) condition is i
LG < 2si
L.
Proof. Recall from our discussion in connection with Theorem 2, since free trade pins down
product and, thus, factor prices, dBi
F=dGj =  i
GiGj=i
GiGi. Furthermore, observe that
country i's FOC (9) implies (i) riK0i
Gi =  i and (ii) riK0i
Gj =  ii
Gj=i
Gi. Then, these
applications of (9) to (A.8) with (A.1){(A.4) and the simplied expression for dBi
F=dGj
gives (A.22). Parts (a) and (b) follow from (A.22). k
Proof of Proposition 7.
Part (a): Note that, by the denition of i
A, Mi
F (i
A) = 0 and observe that the strategic
welfare eect (the second term in the RHS of (12)) is negative when ki
2 > ki
1.
Part (b): By part (a), we have dV i
F (i
A)=d < 0. Furthermore, by Proposition 5, there
exists a suciently high price,  > i
A, such that dG
j
F =d = 0 8 > . But then by (12)
and the denition of i
A, which implies Mi
F () < 0 when evaluated at  > i
A, we must
have dV i
F =d > 0 8 > . Thus, there must exist a price, i
min, that minimizes country i's
welfare and is such that the country exports the land-intensive product: i
min > i
A . k
Proof of Proposition 10. Given the focus on identical adversaries (point D in Figs. 3




F = V 
F, i
A = e p
A 2 (;) and i
min = min for i = 1;2;
(ii) if  = e p
A, then G
F = e G
A and V 
F = e V 
A;




The arming comparisons follow immediately from Proposition 5(a). To establish the welfare
results, rst note that, because e p
A 2 (;), Proposition 5(a) implies dGi
F (e p
A)=d > 0 for





F () = e V 
A. To complete the proof, note that all contestants export the land-intensive
good and V 
F() < e V 
A, 8 2 (e p
A;0) if ki
2 > ki
1, or V 
F() < e V 




Proof of Proposition 11. For concreteness, suppose ki
2 > ki
1. Since we consider secure
factor distributions in the AES subset of S0, it will necessarily be the case that pi
A = e p
A
for i = 1;2, and thus i
A = e p
A.
47Part (a): Since i
A = e p
A for i = 1;2, dGi
F (e p
A)=d > 0 as in Proposition 10. By Proposition
7(b), there will thus exist a price i0, i = 1;2 such that V i
F () < e V i
A , 8 2 (e p
A;i0). Now
dene 00 = minf10;20g. It follows that V i
F () < e V i
A for i = 1;2, 8 2 (e p
A;00).
Part (b): Starting at an arbitrary distribution in the AES subset of S0, transfer a small
quantity of labor from country 2 to country 1 (i.e.,  dL2 = dL1 > 0), so that the nal
distribution is in the AES subset of S1, as indicated by the move from point E to point
H in Fig. 4. Proposition 2(b) and Corollary 1 imply that dV 1
F =dL1 < dV 1
A =dL1 and
dV 2
F =dL1 > dV 2
A =dL1. Since  = e 
A implies V i
F = V i
A initially, we will have V 1
F < V 1
A
and V 2
F > V 2
A after the transfer. By continuity, there exists additional labor transfers
with the just described preferences over trade regimes. k
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